[[Image:LegalSystemsOfTheWorldMap.png|thumb|right|300px|World distribution of major legal traditions]]

The ~~three major '''legal systems~~ Imperative of Legal System for Noahides includes the ~~world''' today consist~~ requirement to set up courts of Justice, and to refrain from any action that would lead to an unjust court decision. Just what are the implications of ~~[[civil law~~ the Noahide imperative on Justice (~~legal system~~Dinim)~~|civil law]]~~is the subject of dispute among major authors. On the one hand, authorities like [[~~common law~~Maimonides]] says: "They are obligated to set up judges and magistrates in every major city to judge according to the above six laws, to warn the nation [regarding their observance]"<ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings 9:14</ref> which seems to imply that the courts need only uphold the first six laws. Other authorities like [[~~religious law~~Nachmanides]]disagree, and envision an entire legal system. ~~However~~ Still other authorities give the national courts complete freedom to legislate anything as long as it doesn't contradict the seven laws, ~~each country (~~see Rabbi Yaakov Anatoli below. The consensus of halacha today is not like [[~~State (law)~~Maimonides]]~~) often develops variations on each~~ , but that the non-Jews are free to set up their own system ~~or incorporates many other features into~~ of laws as long as they don't disagree with the ~~system~~[[Seven Laws|seven basic laws]]. ~~Despite~~ The consensus of halacha today is that the existing national court systems are at least in part Noahide courts; that failing to uphold all seven noahide laws does not invalidate the ~~usefulness~~ national court as a Noahide court; that Noahides can fulfill their requirement of ~~different classifications, every~~ the [[Imperative of Legal System]] through these courts. The major disagreement among ''poskim'' today is if there is any value to the judgments of these national courts beyond their utilitarian value. Noahide Law is a legal system ~~has its own individual identity~~that encompasses, and is the root of all proper religion and society. Noahide Law does not recognize a distinction between [[religion and state]] in terms of law, but contains them both. Most national courts have broken, to various degrees, with any sense of divine sanction for Law, and any attempt to approximate of Divine Law. This is slowly being replaced with a utilitarian, popular law, where legality is defined by majority vote of the population.

==Legal System in Jewish Law (for Noahides)==

Most rabbinic authorities consider the Seven Noahide Laws a parallel system of general categories of commandments, each containing many components and details.

* Some rabbinic opinion regards the determination of the details of the Noahide Law as something to be left to Jewish rabbis. This, in addition to the teaching of the Jewish law that punishment for violating one of the seven Noahide Laws includes a theoretical death penalty (Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin 57a), is a factor in modern opposition to the notion of a Noahide legal system. Jewish scholars respond by noting that Jews today no longer carry out the death penalty, even within the Jewish community. Jewish law, in contemporary practice, sees the [[death penalty]] as an indicator of the seriousness of an offense; violators are not actually put to death.

* Other rabbinic opinion holds that penalties are a detail of the Noahide Laws and that Noahides themselves must determine the details of their own laws for themselves. According to this school of thought - see N. Rakover, ''Law and the Noahides'' (1998); M. Dallen, ''The Rainbow Covenant'' (2003)- the Noahide Laws offer mankind a set of absolute values and a framework for righteousness and justice, while the detailed laws that are currently on the books of the world's states and nations are presumptively valid.

===Rabbi Yaakov Anatoli (1194-1256)===

When the Noahites were enjoined concerning Justice, they were put under obligation to create legal arrangements .... It is incumbent on the judges to draw up rules of equity that shall be appropriate for that particular country, as exemplified by the manner in which this matter is handled currently by the nations, severally. Likewise, it is incumbent upon merchants and upon the members of the trades to establish regulations for themselves... and whatever emerges as the law in this manner is law, as much as that which is written in the Bible. Furthermore, anyone violating this law violates Scripture, because Scripture commands the individual to accept the decisions of the contemporary jurists. The dictum, "The law of the land is the Law," relates to this concept.<ref>Quoted by Reuben Margolioth, Margolioth Hayarn. Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1958, volume 11, page 20. (Sanhedrin 56b, section 9.)</ref>

===Nahmanides===

Nahmanides begins his statement of view by quoting a comment by Maimonides concerning the destruction of the city of Shechern by Simon and Levi in retaliation for the rape of their sister at the hands of the city's favorite son, in the 34th chapter of Genesis:

:The Master [Maimonides] explains in his volume on judges [Code, "Laws for Kings" 9:14], that since Noahites are charged with upholding justice - meaning that they must appoint judges who are to rule on their [remaining] six laws in each and every town - and, furthermore, since a Noahite who violates any one of his laws is to be executed by the sword, therefore all citizens of Shechern were fit to die, because Shechern [the son] stole and they all saw and knew it but they did not bring him to justice.

:I do not think this explanation is correct. For if so, then their father, Jacob, should have been under obligation to assume a leading role in the executions; and if he was afraid why did he wax angry at his sons to the extent that long after he cursed their fury, he punished them, and he scattered them. Had they not done a good thing, having had faith in the Lord and He granted them success?

:Anyway, to my mind, this justice which is enumerated among the Seven Laws of Noah is not limited to the establishment of courts. Rather, it charges the Noahites with laws on stealing, overcharging, withholding salaries, the liability of watchmen, rape, seduction, damages, bodily injury, loans, business transactions, and the like, similar to the laws with which the Israelites are charged. Thus, they place themselves under threat of execution by stealing, or cheating, or raping, or seducing another's daughter, or burning down another's silo, or injuring him, and the like. It is this same law that also obligates them to appoint judges in each town, like the Israelites. However, if they neglect to do this they are not to be executed, because this derives from a positive imperative, and the rule of "Their prohibition [when violated, constitutes grounds for] their execution," applies only for the negative imperatives...<ref>Nahmanides, Pirush al HaTorah (Commentary on the Pentateuch). Edited and annotated by Charles B. Chavel. Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1959, volume 1, page 191.</ref>

===Rabbi Moses Isserles (circa 1500)===

Noahide justice does not leave it for each judge or government to develop original principles of equity; rather, a set of such principles are part and parcel of Noahism, under Justice. This idea is further developed, and extended, by Moses Isserles (circa 1500) who reads this very issue into a talmudic argument:

:...Rabbi Johanan, [in Sanhedrin 56b,] maintains that Noahites are compelled, under the requirements of justice, merely to uphold the national customs, and to judge between man and man fairly. But Noahites are not compelled to be in consonance with Israel's law, bequeathed by the hands of Moses at Sinai, because Noahic law is purely a law of social accord ... the statutes of Israel are one thing and the statutes of Noah are another.

:However, Rabbi Isaac has a different approach. He maintains [ibid.] that Noahic Justice involves the very law which Jews were bequeathed at Sinai ... and it seems to me that the opinion of Rabbi Isaac prevails, because...<ref>Moses Isserles, Sheilot U'Teshuvot Rarno, Sudylkow; Isaac Madpis, printer, 1835, page 7, Responsum 10.</ref>

===Rabbi Aaron Lictenstein===

After discussing the [[Seven Laws as Categories]], Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein attempts define which of the 613 laws, based on Maimonides' Book of Divine Commandments, would fall under the Noahide Imperative of Legal System and therefore apply to Noahides, he writes:<ref>[[Aaron Lichtenstein|Lichtenstein, Aaron]]. "The Seven Laws of Noah". New York: The Rabbi Jacob Joseph School Press and Z. Berman Books, 2d ed. 1986</ref>

Just what are the implications of the Noahide imperative on Justice (Dinim) is the subject of dispute among major authors. All agree however that the following two aspects are implied: (a) that courts shall be established and (b) that any act which contributes to an unjust court decision shall be prohibited. That these two aspects are involved derives from the Talmudic remark to the effect that justice has reference to both (a) required acts of commission and (b) prohibited acts. <ref>Sanhedrin 59a: "Qum v'ase v'shev v'al t'ase." - See Rashi's marginal comment, ad locum.</ref>

The following imperatives from among the Mosaic 613 are implicit in these two aspects of the Noahic law on justice:

:1. ". . . to appoint judges and officers in each and every community." Positive 176. <ref>Tosefta, Avoda Zara, chapter 9: "Just as Israelites must establish a court in each city and town, so the Noahites must establish a court in each city and town. "</ref> :2. "...to treat the litigants equally before the law." Positive 177. :3. "...to inquire diligently into the testimony of a witness." Positive 179. :4. "...against the wanton miscarriage of justice by the court." Negative 273. :5. "...against the judge accepting a bribe or gift from a litigant." Negative 274. :6. "...against the judge showing marks of honor to but one litigant." Negative 275. :7. "...against the judge acting in fear of a litigant's threats." Negative 276. Some leniency is extended to the Noahide judge in this connection according to Nahmanides, Pirush al HaTorah (Commentary on the Pentateuch), on Genesis 34:13, who quotes the Jerusalemite Talmud as saying: "Under Israelite law, you may not decline to serve as a judge as long as you are safe from repercussions, but you may decline when you are not safe from repercussions. However, under Noahic law you may decline in any event." Nonetheless, Negative 276 is listed here as having Noahide import because the talmudic quote seems to refer only to the initial refusal to hear a case due to fear of threats, whereas Negative 276 is also addressed at a judge who is already presiding, and who is tempted to render an unjust decision in face of personal danger. The latter surely constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Thus, it seems probable that when Nahmanicles, in reference to Negative 276, writes, - 'Fear no man (in judgment]' is an added feature of Mosaic [not Noahide] law" (ibid.) he means to give a Noahite more latitude in refusing to hand down a decision, but probably he does not mean to sanction an unjust decision. Possibly, this extra latitude for the Noahite judge finds expression in a situation such as described in the following halakha: "When two litigants - a mild one and a vicious one - approach you with their dispute you may say to them 'I refuse to judge your case,' as long as you have not as yet heard their arguments or, even having heard their arguments, as long as you do not know who is the more likely to win, lest the vicious litigant lose and try to kill you. But once you have heard their arguments and know who is the more likely to win, you may not say 'I refuse to judge your case,' because of the dictum, 'Fear no man'…" (Imperative 415, Sefer HaHinnuch). Nahmanides may mean to sanction the withdrawal of a Noahite judge even after he knows which litigant is likely to emerge victorious. See Joseph Babad, Minhat Hinnuch. New York: Saphrograph, 1950, Part 111, page 76 (Imperative 415): "I think Noahites, too, are implicated in this 'Do not fear' according to Nahmanides…" Also see Rashi, Sanhedrin 56b last line: "The fear of Me shall be upon you,'implies but not the fear of men, as in Deuteronomy 5,'Fear no man, for judgment is of the Lord,' that is, justice [of the Seven Laws]." :8. "...against the judge, out of compassion, favoring a poor litigant." Negative 277. :9. "...against the judge discriminating against the litigant because he is a sinner." Negative 278. :10. "...against the judge, out of softness, putting aside the penalty of a mauler or killer." Negative 279. :11. "...against the judge discriminating against a stranger or an orphan." Negative 280. The idea here is to require equal treatment for those who are weak or meek for lack of relatives and friends. However, "stranger" in the Israelite statute, may refer strictly to "proselyte," in which case only "orphan" would have significance for the Noahide law here. :12. "...against the judge hearing one litigant in the absence of the other." Negative 281. :13. "...against appointing a judge who lacks knowledge of the Law." Negative 284. Cf. Joseph Babad, Minhat Hinnuch. New York: Saphrograph, 1950, Part III, page 76 (Imperative 414): "Perhaps the Noahites too are included in this prohibition, and must appoint only a man who is erudite in Torah with regard to the laws that pertain to the Noahites." Also see remark of Aaron HaLevi, there, who considers Negative 284 a natural component of the pursuit of justice when he writes: ". . . an untutored judge will acquit the guilty and condemn the innocent. The rationale behind this command should be clear to all." :14. "...against the court killing an innocent man." Negative 289. :15. "...against incrimination by circumstantial evidence." Negative 290. :16. "...against punishing for a crime committed under duress." Negative 294. Cf. Maimonides, Code, "Laws on Kings" 10:2, "A Noahite who is forced - because his life is in danger - to transgress any of his laws is permitted to transgress." At this point it should be noted that the threats in Negative 276 (against a judge acting in fear of a litigant's threats,) are not such threats that constitute a clear and present danger to the life of the judge, or he would probably be permitted to misjudge in order to save his own life. :17. "...that the court is to administer the death penalty by the sword [i.e., decapitation]." Positive 226. ::See [[Capital Punishment in Noahide law]] :18. "...against anyone taking the law into his own hands to kill the perpetrator of a capital crime." Negative 292. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin, Haarnek Shaela (Commentary on Sheiltoth of Ahai Gaon). Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1961, volume 1, page 16 (section 2:3). The discussion there centers on how justice may have application for the Noahide lay citizen - for in the main justice seems directed at the presiding jurists. N.Z.J. Berlin concludes that each Noahite "is compelled to desist from enforcement of the remaining six laws except via the court. That is, a witness to a murder may not execute the murderer, but must wait for the trial…" However, another writer disagrees: Babad, in Minhat Hinnuch, Part 111, page 72 (Imperative 409) writes: "The Noahites are not restricted in this way [Negative 2921 but may judge singly and at once." Babad repeats this remark on page 73, ibid. :19. "...to testify in court." Positive 178. Thus, another example of how each citizen is expected to participate in the quest for justice is when he is called as a material witness. That Noahites are so implicated can be derived from Sanhedrin 57b, as follows: "A Noahite can be condemned on the testimony of a man, but not on a woman's ... Rav Hamnuna raised the following question here, 'You say that a woman is not obligated to pursue Justice? Notice that because a woman is ineligible to testify, Rav Hamnuna concluded that she is under no obligation with regard to Justice. Apparently, when a Noahite testifies in court he is fulfilling one of his obligations under justice. :20. "...against testifying falsely." Negative 285. If, as in Positive 178 above, a Noahite is under obligation to enlighten the court with his testimony, one may safely conclude that the Noahite has not met this obligation when his testimony leaves the truth unsaid. Cf. Philip Biberfeld, Das Noachidische Urrecht. Frankfurt, 1937, page 64. Thus, twenty from among the Mosaic 613 have application for the Noahite under Justice. According to Maimonides – and most writers probably would side with him - Justice purports nothing more than the spirit of these twenty items. However, Nahmanides (Ramban) objects. He views justice as signifying much more. Nahmanides ascribes to justice a compilation of statutes which directs the judge in making the appropriate decision in every case of "stealing ... rape ... bodily injury ... business transactions, and the like." In other words, the Noahic category of justice alludes to an actual code of law. Most of the statutes to which Nahmanides refers are designated Positive 236 through Positive 246. Would Nahmanides, then, have us add Positive 236 - Positive 246 (and similar statutes) to the twenty listed above? No, for the following reason: When Nahmanides writes "similar to the laws with which the Israelite are charged," he does not mean that the Noahide laws here are the same as the corresponding Israelite laws. He cannot mean this because the talmudic sources specifically differentiate between Noahic and Mosaic law in the very cases Nahmanides enumerates.<ref> For example, for the seduction of a virgin biblical law exacts a punitive fine of fifty shekalim (Exodus 22:15), but according to Sanhedrin 56b there are no punitive fines (dine qenasot) in Noahic legislation. Another example: on the question of whether the conclusion of a business transaction comes at the time of payment (kesef) or at the time of delivery (meshikha), the Talmud designates one for Jews and the other one ;or non-Jews even before it is clear which applies to whom (Bechorot 13s). Also, see Note 56 above, for an example of how Nahmanides himself differentiates between Noahide and biblical procedure.</ref> What Nahmanides must mean is that just as the Israelite code has a definite ruling for each civil dispute, "similarly" the Noahide tradition has a definite – but not necessarily an identical - ruling. That is to say, Noahide justice does not leave it for each judge or government to develop original principles of equity; rather, a set of such principles are part and parcel of Noahism, under Justice. This idea is further developed, and extended, by Moses Isserles (circa 1500) who reads this very issue into a talmudic argument. Here again caution should be exercised not to misread Isserles to mean that all Noahic and Sinaitic laws are identical, and Isserles himself goes on to make mention of some aspects wherein the two systems differ. Still Isserles, more so than is apparent from the words of Nahmanides, sees the two systems as having a great deal in common. For according to Isserles, the civil laws of the two systems differ only where the Talmudic sources explicitly note the dissimilarity, "but otherwise one should not presume to exclude the Noahite from Mosaic principles."<ref>Moses Isserles, Sheilot U'Teshuvot Rarno, Sudylkow; Isaac Madpis, printer, 1835, page 7, Responsum 10.</ref> That Justice should be thought of as referring to a thorough going system containing points of law, as Nahmanides and Isserles see it, is denied by at least one early author. Jacob Anatoli (1194-1256) expresses the view, in his Hamelamed, that the Noahide tradition does not feature a comprehensive code of standard regulations under Justice. Nonetheless, Anatoli could agree to the inclusion of the twenty imperatives which are listed above as features of Noahide Justice. For these twenty are but manifestations of those two aspects by which the talmudic sources define Justice, (a) that courts shall be established and (b) that any act which contributes to an unjust decision be prohibited. ===Chaim Clorfene and Yakov Rogalsky=== According to Chaim Clorfene and Yakov Rogalsky in the "Path of the Righteous Gentile"<ref>Clorfene, Chaim and Yaakov Rogalsky ''[http://moshiach.com/action/morality/introduction.php The Path of the Righteous Gentile: An Introduction to the Seven Laws of the Children of Noah]''. New York: Phillip Feldheim, 1987</ref> the Children of Noah are commanded to establish courts of law that will carry out justice and maintain human righteousness and morality in accord with the Seven Universal Laws.<ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings, chapter 9, law 14</ref> A court system that perverts justice by handing down rulings in conflict with the Seven Universal Laws is an instrument for driving God's blessings out of the world. Anyone who fails to establish a court system, that is, who lives in a community or city in which there are no courts, and who does nothing to correct the situation, is punishable by death. One who establishes or maintains courts of law that operate contrary to the Seven Universal Laws is similarly liable. In the Book of Genesis (34:25), we learn that two of Jacob's sons, Simeon and Levi, slew every male in the city of Shechem. The prince of the community, Shechem, son of Hamor, had raped their sister, Dinah, and the city failed to execute justice by bringing him to a court of law. The city was therefore guilty of transgressing this seventh of the Seven Universal Laws, and every citizen was liable for punishment. 2. The commandment to establish courts of law, though it might appear to be a positive commandment calling for affirmative action, is considered a prohibition. In effect, the commandment to establish courts of law is a prohibition against failing to establish courts of law, because failure to establish appropriate courts inhibits the performance of justice throughout the nations.<ref>Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 59a, Rashi</ref> 3. The only punishment meted out by the Noahide courts of law in criminal cases is the death penalty.<ref>Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 56b, Rashi</ref> 4. One accused of a transgression of the Seven Universal Laws and brought to trial in a Noahide court may be convicted only if he is found to be mentally competent.<ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings, chapter 10, law 2</ref>

~~2. ''.~~ 5. Every individual must accept a legal decision he has received. It is forbidden for an individual to render a judgment himself (vigilante justice) without going to ~~treat the litigants equally before the~~ a court of law.~~" Positive 177.~~<ref>Encyclopedia Talmudica, volume 3, page 355</ref>

~~3. ". .~~ 6. In civil matters, that is, cases between individual parties, later authorities question whether the Noahide is commanded to ~~inquire diligently into~~ follow the ~~testimony of a witness." Positive 179~~same principles as Jewish law and Jewish courts, or whether he is to follow rulings established by his own Noahide courts and laws.

~~4. ". . . against~~ Although the Noahide courts are responsibile for only the Seven Universal Laws, not the 613 laws of the ~~wanton miscarriage~~ Torah, there is an opinion that each decision of ~~justice by~~ the ~~court~~Noahide courts must follow its counterpart in Jewish Law.~~" Negative 273~~The accepted opinion, however, is that Noahide judges and courts of law are to render legal decisions according to their own laws and principles of law.

57. ~~". . . against the judge accepting~~ [[Arbitration]] and mediation or any other means of finding an amicable settlement or compromise, thereby avoiding a ~~bribe or gift from~~ court trial, is desirable, and, more than that, it is a ~~litigant." Negative 274~~commandment to seek compromise.

68. ~~". . . against~~ Circumstantial evidence is admissible in the ~~judge showing marks~~ Noahide courts of ~~honor to but one litigant." Negative 275~~law.

79. ~~". . . against~~ The Children of Noah are responsible for knowledge of the ~~judge acting~~ Seven Universal Laws, and therefore one does not have to be warned that he is committing a transgression in ~~fear~~ order to be accused in a court of ~~a litigant's threats." Negative 276~~law. <ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings, chapter 9, law 14</ref>

810. "It is forbidden for a court to have compassion on a murderer, saying that since one person has already been killed, what purpose could there be in killing another? And the court may not delay the execution because of compassion. ~~. . against the judge~~<ref>Mishneh Torah, ~~out~~ Laws of ~~compassion~~Sanhedrin, chapter 20, ~~favoring a poor litigant." Negative 277.~~law 4</ref>

911. ~~". . . against~~ Similarly, in financial litigation, the court may not have mercy on a poor person, taking the attitude that a rich plaintiff has an obligation to support the ~~judge discriminating against~~ poor, therefore finding for the ~~litigant because~~ poor defendant so that he ~~is a sinner." Negative 278~~will be supported with an honorable livelihood.

1012. "It is similarly forbidden to pay prejudicial respect to a great person. ~~. . against~~ If two litigants appear in court, one a great wise man and the other a simple person, the judgemay not ask about the welfare of the great one nor express pleasure at being in his presence in any way, ~~out~~ nor give him honor in any way. Otherwise, the arguments of ~~softness~~the simple person would be stifled. He would think, ~~putting aside~~ "What's the use anyway?" The judge must not favor either party until judgment is finished. And the sages warn that a judge must not think that since the ~~penalty of~~ litigant is so great a ~~mauler~~ person, it is unseemly to embarrass him or ~~killer." Negative 279~~see him in his embarrassment.

1113. ~~". . . against~~ If two litigants appear in court, and one is a righteous person while the other is a wicked person, the judge ~~discriminating~~ should not presume that the wicked person will not tell the truth, nor presume that he will not change his ways, and therefore the judgment should go against ~~a stranger or an orphan~~him.~~" Negative 280~~<ref>Ibid. , chapter 20, law 5</ref>

1214. "One should not judge unrighteously, acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent. ~~. . against~~ And a judge who delays the judgment, lengthening the time of the ~~judge hearing one litigant~~ testimony or cross-examination, in order to cause either of the ~~absence~~ litigants to suffer, falls under the ruling of ~~the other~~judging unrighteously.~~" Negative 281~~<ref>Ibid., chapter 20, law 6</ref>

1315. ~~". . . against appointing~~ One who judges haughtily, without fearing his awesome responsibility and without due deliberation, and then comes to a ~~judge who lacks knowledge of~~ decision quickly before he has taken the time to carefully consider the ~~Law~~case, is considered stupid, wicked, and coarsely egotistical.~~" Negative 284~~<ref>Ibid. , chapter 20, law 7</ref>

1416. "The courts should not establish a standard judgment by which numerous cases may be judged according to a precedent system, but should consider each case individually on its own unique merits. <ref>Ibid. , chapter 20, law 8</ref> (Note: Precedent in legal cases may be followed as guidelines, however. ~~against the court killing an innocent man." Negative 289.~~)

1517. "A case concerning a large sum of money and a case concerning a small amount of money should be given equal and individual consideration. <ref>Ibid. ~~. against incrimination by circumstantial evidence." Negative 290.~~ , chapter 20, law 10</ref>

~~16. "~~18. It is a positive commandment to deliver a righteous judgment, treating the two claimants equally in every respect. The judge may not permit one to explain his case at great length while telling the other to keep his words brief. ~~against punishing for a crime committed under duress~~Nor should the judge be pleasant and smile at one while being short and gruff to the other.~~" Negative 294~~<ref>Ibid. , chapter 21, law 1</ref>

~~17. "~~19. A judge is forbidden to take a bribe. Bribery will certainly corrupt any judgment. ~~that the court~~ A judge who takes a bribe is obligated to ~~administer~~ return the ~~death penalty by~~ bribe if the ~~sword [i~~giver demands it.e<ref>Ibid., ~~decapitation]." Positive 226.~~ chapter 23, law 1</ref>

~~18. "~~20. It is also forbidden to offer a bribe to a judge. <ref>Ibid. ~~against anyone taking the~~ , chapter 23, law ~~into his own hands~~ 2</ref> The category of bribery is not limited to ~~kill the perpetrator~~ money, but includes any type of ~~a capital crime~~gift or favor.~~" Negative 292~~<ref>Ibid. , chapter 23, law 3</ref>

1921. "Any judge who sits in judgment and attempts to magnify his importance, even in order to increase the wages of his bailiff or the court clerk, is in the category of one who leans after the wrong things. Once a judge was entering a boat to cross a river. A man who had a case in litigation before the judge was on the boat and stretched out his hand to help the judge aboard. The judge told him, "Behold, I am disqualified to ~~testify in court~~judge your case." ~~Positive 178.~~

20Note: The goal of justice is to function as impartially and righteously as possible, to the ultimate degree. ~~against testifying falsely~~The following section delineates some of the details of the standards of the Jewish Bet Din, the ecclesiastical court.~~" Negative 285~~The Noahide courts are not obligated to follow these rules, but must be acquainted with them as points of reference.

~~Thus, twenty from among~~ 22. Two litigants appear before a judge. One is dressed very elegantly with expensive clothing and the ~~Mosaic 613 have application for~~ other is wearing the ~~Noahite under Justice~~clothes of a pauper. ~~According~~ The judge should tell the elegantly dressed one, "You should clothe the other one until he is dressed as elegantly as you are, or you should clothe yourself to ~~Maimonides –~~ appear as he does, and ~~most writers probably would side~~ then you can enter judgment with him ~~- Justice purports nothing more than the spirit of these twenty items~~. ~~However, Nahmanides (Ramban) objects~~"<ref>Ibid. He views justice as signifying much more. Nahmanides begins his statement of view by quoting a comment by Maimonides concerning the destruction of the city of Shechern by Simon and Levi in retaliation for the rape of their sister at the hands of the city's favorite son, ~~in the 34th~~ chapter ~~of Genesis:~~21, law 2</ref>

23. The ~~Master [Maimonides] explains in his volume on judges [Code, "Laws~~ litigants should both sit or stand; it is improper for ~~Kings" 9:14]~~one to stand and the other to sit. If the judge wishes to seat them both, ~~that since Noahites are charged with upholding justice - meaning that~~ he may do so. If they ~~must appoint judges who are to rule on their [remaining] six laws in each and every town - and~~sit, ~~furthermore~~they should sit side by side, ~~since a Noahite who violates any~~ neither one ~~of his laws~~ higher than the other, and they may so sit during the entire time that the judge is listening to the case. But when the judge's decision is being announced, then both litigants should be ~~executed by~~ standing. The "decision" is the ~~sword, therefore all citizens of Shechern were fit to die, because Shechern [~~judge's announcement finding for the ~~son] stole~~ defendant and ~~they all saw~~ against the plaintiff or for the plaintiff and ~~knew it but they did not bring him to justice~~against the defendant. Witnesses for either side should always stand during testimony.<ref>Ibid. , chapter 21, law 3</ref>

~~I do not think this explanation is correct~~24. ~~For if so~~If there are many cases before the judge, ~~then their father~~the case of an orphan should precede the case of a widow, ~~Jacob~~and the case of a widow should precede the case of a Torah scholar, and the case of a scholar should ~~have been under obligation to assume a leading role in~~ precede the ~~executions;~~ case of an unlearned man, and ~~if he was afraid why did he wax angry at his sons to~~ the ~~extent that long after he cursed their fury~~case of a woman should precede the case of a man, ~~he punished them~~for a woman's embarrassment is greater.<ref>Ibid., ~~and he scattered them. Had they not done a good thing~~chapter 21, ~~having had faith in the Lord and He granted them success?~~law 6</ref>

~~Anyway, to my mind, this justice which~~ 25. It is ~~enumerated among~~ forbidden for the ~~Seven Laws of Noah is not limited~~ judge to hear the ~~establishment~~ plea of ~~courts. Rather, it charges the Noahites with laws on stealing, overcharging, withholding salaries, the liability~~ one of ~~watchmen, rape, seduction, damages, bodily injury, loans, business transactions, and~~ the ~~like, similar to~~ litigants unless the ~~laws with which the Israelites are charged~~other one is also present. ~~Thus, they place themselves under threat~~ To listen to even one word of ~~execution by stealing, or cheating, or raping, or seducing another's daughter, or burning down another's silo, or injuring him, and~~ the ~~like~~case itself is forbidden. ~~It is this same law~~ And we warn the litigant that ~~also obligates them to appoint judges in each town, like the Israelites. However, if they neglect to do this they are~~ he should not allow his words to be ~~executed, because this derives from a positive imperative, and~~ heard before the ~~rule of "Their prohibition [when violated~~other litigant arrives.<ref>Ibid., ~~constitutes grounds for] their execution~~chapter 21,~~" applies only for the negative imperatives . . . .~~ law 7</ref>

In 26. The judge may not hear testimony through an interpreter or a translator, as the ~~above, Nahmanides ascribes to justice a compilation~~ truth is reached only by hearing the words of ~~statutes which directs~~ the ~~judge in making~~ litigants themselves. He must understand the ~~appropriate decision in every case~~ language of ~~"stealing~~ the litigants and hear their testimony and proofs.~~.. rape ... bodily injury ... business transactions~~If the judge does not speak their language fluently, he may use an interpreter to reply to the litigants to inform them of the judgment and the ~~like~~reason he found for this one and against that one.~~" In other words~~<ref>Ibid., chapter 21, ~~the Noahic category of justice alludes to an actual code of~~ law.8</ref>

~~Most~~ 27. The judge must hear the arguments of the ~~statutes to which Nahmanides refers are designated Positive 236 through Positive 246. Would Nahmanides~~litigants, then~~, have us add Positive 236 - Positive 246 (and similar statutes) to~~ review the ~~twenty listed above? No, for the following reason: When Nahmanides writes "similar~~ arguments in their presence to ~~the laws with which the Israelite are charged,"~~ be sure that he ~~does not mean that the Noahide laws here are the same as the corresponding Israelite laws~~understands them clearly. ~~He cannot mean this because~~ Then he righteously decides the ~~talmudic sources specifically differentiate between Noahic and Mosaic law~~ case in ~~the very cases Nahmanides enumerates. What Nahmanides must mean is that just as the Israelite code has a definite ruling for each civil dispute~~his heart, ~~"similarly"~~ and afterward he reaches the ~~Noahide tradition has a definite – but not necessarily an identical - ruling~~final decision. ~~That is to say, Noahide justice does not leave it for each judge or government to develop original principles of equity; rather, a set of such principles are part and parcel of Noahism, under Justice~~<ref>Ibid. ~~This idea is further developed~~, ~~and extended~~chapter 21, ~~by Moses Isserles (circa 1500) who reads this very issue into a talmudic argument:~~law 9</ref>

28.~~.. Rabbi Johanan, [in Sanhedrin 56b,] maintains that Noahites are compelled, under the requirements of justice, merely to uphold the national customs, and to~~ The judge ~~between man and man fairly. But Noahites are~~ should not ~~compelled to be in consonance with Israel's law, bequeathed by~~ defend the ~~hands~~ words of ~~Moses at Sinai~~the litigant, ~~because Noahic law is purely a law of social accord ..~~but he should sit silently as each litigant says what he feels he must. And the ~~statutes~~ judge should not instruct either of ~~Israel are one thing and~~ the ~~statutes~~ litigants in his presentation of ~~Noah are another~~any argument.<ref>Ibid., chapter 21, law 10</ref>

~~However, Rabbi Isaac has~~ 29. If the judge sees a ~~different approach. He maintains [ibid.] that Noahic Justice involves~~ favorable point in the case of either of the litigants and the litigant does not know how to bring forth the ~~very law which Jews were bequeathed at Sinai ...~~ point, or gets angry and ~~it seems~~ confused to ~~me that~~ the ~~opinion~~ point of ~~Rabbi Isaac prevails~~being unable to state his case clearly, ~~because~~ the judge may come to his aid slightly and put him on the right track to state the beginning of his case. But the judge must be careful of how he does this so as to avoid instructing the litigant in how to present a meritorious case, for if the judge did this, he would be perverting justice. <ref>Ibid. . , chapter 21, law 11</ref>

~~Here again caution should be exercised not~~ 30. Prior to ~~misread Isserles to mean that all Noahic and Sinaitic laws are identical~~the judge's hearing the case, ~~and Isserles himself goes on to make mention~~ if he feels personally threatened by either of ~~some aspects wherein~~ the ~~two systems differ~~litigants, he may refuse to sit in judgment. ~~Still Isserles~~But if he has already heard their words and knows which way the judgment is leaning, ~~more so than~~ it is ~~apparent from~~ not proper for the ~~words~~ judge to refuse to pass judgment out of fear of one of ~~Nahmanides, sees~~ the ~~two systems as having a great deal in common~~litigants.<ref>Ibid. ~~For according to Isserles~~, ~~the civil laws of the two systems differ only where the Talmudic sources explicitly note the dissimilarity~~chapter 22, ~~"but otherwise one should not presume to exclude the Noahite from Mosaic principles."~~ law 1</ref>

~~Maimonides would not necessarily dispute Nahmanides' assertion that Noahide Justice has reference to an actual tradition of specific rulings~~31. ~~Isserles surely sees~~ If there is more than one judge in a case, it ~~this way,~~ is forbidden for ~~in his essay he quotes Maimonides extensively in search~~ any of ~~support for the thesis that justice embodies an actual code. Where Maimonides does differ with Nahmanides is that~~ them to say after the ~~latter maintains that it is justice which alludes to a compilation of all Noahide regulations~~trial, ~~whereas Maimonides simply sees~~ "I judged in ~~each of~~ your merit, but my colleagues found against you and inasmuch as they were the ~~Seven Laws an implicit expression of that part of the Noahide law with which it is concerned~~majority, what could I do?”<ref>Ibid. ~~That is~~, ~~the laws on homicide are implicit in the category of Homicide; the laws on stealing - which are what Nahmanides largely deals with there - are implicit in Theft~~chapter 22, ~~not justice.~~law 7</ref>

~~Surely Maimonides' position~~ 32. A judge is forbidden to sit in judgment with a ~~logical one~~colleague whom he knows to be a thief or a wicked person. Furthermore, what significant difference does Nahmanides see between theoretically considering justice the depository of all the laws, and theoretically considering these laws as implicit within each of the various sections? A second question that Nahmanides would have to answer He must not sit in judgment with another until he knows with whom he is~~: if justice "charges the Noahites~~ sitting. And no one should sign a contract until he knows with ~~laws on stealing" etc~~whom he is signing.<ref>Ibid., ~~why is the category of Theft required at all?~~ chapter 22, law 10</ref>

In 33. A judge is forbidden to judge someone he loves, even though it is less than a great abiding love. Nor can he judge one he hates, even though the ~~view of these questions~~person is not his enemy. Ideally, the ~~statement~~ litigants should be equal in the eyes and ~~position~~ heart of ~~Nahmanides are best understood as follows:~~the judge. If he recognizes neither them nor their deeds, he can render the most honest judgment possible.<ref>Ibid., chapter 23, law 6</ref>

~~The one part~~ 34. Men of Maimonides' statement to which Nahmanides objects strongly is the assertion that there can be prosecution by the court for neglect to bring a wrongdoer to justice. Nahmanides argues that such neglect - it being a crime learning who are contemptuous of ~~omission - does~~ each other should not ~~invite punitive action~~judge a case together. ~~And yet, Nahmanides~~ The judgment is ~~hard put~~ likely to ~~explain away the implication that each one of all the Seven Laws calls for punitive action~~be distorted, because the Talmud makes no distinctions when it states, "Their prohibition [when violated, constitutes sufficient grounds for] their execution. Rav Huna and Rav Judah and all the students of Rav say, 'For each of as the Seven Laws a Noahite may be executed.' " And while Nahmanides might defend himself by noting that when justice is violated via an act of commission – such as when a judge accepts a bribe - punitive action does properly apply, still Nahmanides contempt would ~~have~~ incline one to ~~take into account that this case (~~contradict the ~~transgression~~ opinions of ~~justice via an act of commission) is conceived by~~ the ~~Talmud as being but a concomitant of justice and not its primary aspect~~other.<ref>Ibid. , chapter 23, law 7</ref>

~~It is this difficulty which Nahmanides is intent upon eluding when he designates the primary aspect of justice a code, an entity,~~ 35. A judge should imagine himself with a ~~body of statutes,~~ sword resting on his neck and ~~consequently neither acts~~ the Pit of ~~commission nor acts of omission~~Hell open below him. ~~Instead, these positive~~ And he should know Who is the Judge and ~~negative aspects are outgrowths~~ in front of ~~the code~~ Whom he judges, and ~~are equally basic; therefore it is not strange that~~ Who will seek retribution from him if he strays from the ~~Talmud ascribes court penalties to all the Seven Laws~~truth.<ref>Ibid., chapter 23, ~~Justice included.~~law 8</ref>

~~This then~~ 36. If a judge feels deeply in his heart that one of the litigants is in the ~~answer to~~ right, and there is no proof for it, or if the ~~first question raised above. (Namely, what significant difference does Nahmanides see between theoretically considering justice~~ judge feels that there is deception and trickery afoot by one of the ~~depository~~ litigants or with one of ~~all~~ the ~~laws~~witnesses, and ~~theoretically considering these laws as implicit within each~~ there is no proof for it, or if he feels he cannot rely on the words of the ~~various sections?) Nahmanides attaches no significance~~ witnesses even if he is not able to disqualify them, or if another similar situation arises, then this ~~theoretical difference~~ judge must disqualify himself from the case and ~~he disputes Maimonides in this connection only~~ be replaced by one who can judge with a whole heart in the ~~effort to defend his main argument:~~ matter. But if the judge knows for sure that ~~neglect to bring a wrongdoer to justice~~ one of the witnesses is lying, he should not ~~a punishable offense~~remove himself from the case, but judge it according to his understanding of the truth. And all these things are matters of the heart.<ref>Ibid. ~~The two issues dovetail~~, ~~as seen above.~~chapter 24, law I</ref>

~~Nahmanides may have felt especially secure~~ 37. If a judge errs in ~~this view because the word Dinim - which~~ his decision in ~~keeping with accepted usage is translated here as justice - is markedly unlike the other six terms which the Talmud has coined. The other six conjure up an activity~~a financial matter, ~~such as theft~~he should retract his decision, ~~illicit relations~~restore everything to its original status, ~~blasphemy~~and retry the case. If it is not possible to retract and restore, ~~etc.~~for instance, one of the litigants went to a foreign land and ~~evidently~~ took the ~~point is to tag each activity either desirable~~ money awarded him, or ~~immoral. But~~ the ~~term Dinim translated precisely~~ like, then the judge is ~~"Laws"; whereas pursuing justice is best denoted by~~ held harmless from making restitution of the ~~term Mishpat~~money. So It is clear that ~~Maimonides would be under obligation to explain the substitution~~ he had no intention of ~~Dinim for Mishpat~~causing damage. ~~However in Nahmanides' view Dinim is just that: a group of laws~~<ref>Ibid. , chapter 6, law 1</ref>

~~Turning now to the second question which was directed at Nahmanides (namely, why after justice is Theft needed at all?) one achieves~~ 38. Every judge should possess the following ~~understanding~~seven attributes:* Wisdom* Humility* Fear of Heaven* Fear of sin* Contempt for money* Love of truth* Beloved by his fellow man* A good reputation<ref>Ibid., chapter 2, law 7</ref>

~~Theft serves to tag stealing as being immoral, so that every~~ 39. When is one beloved by his fellow man ~~of -honor will avoid it~~? When he views things in a favorable light and is humble, ~~even when the theft will never come to light~~ and ~~no charges will~~ he speaks and conducts business in a pleasant manner. He should be ~~pressed. This parallels~~ meticulous in fulfilling the ~~remaining five Noahic laws which are designed~~ commandments of God, and he should have conquered his evil inclination to~~, inform~~ the ~~individual of~~ point that he is without blemish. His name should serve as an outstanding model for the ~~evil inherent~~ generation. He should be courageous in ~~those acts~~order to exact a righteous judgment against strong‑willed wrongdoers. ~~(In religious terms~~Money should not be precious to him so that he will not chase after it, ~~these acts are thereby proclaimed~~ for it is taught that if one desires to be ~~sins~~rich, poverty will come upon him.~~) The seventh law~~He should not need to be exhorted to strive after truth, ~~Dinim, features a different dimension however~~but should pursue truth from his own desire for it. ~~It instructs society, as represented by the court, on how to regulate~~ He must love truth and ~~process any breach~~ despise whatever opposes truth. And he must flee from all forms of ~~these standards. In other words, Dinim is procedural law, while Theft is substantive Iaw~~transgression.

~~One additional point should be granted so as to put our understanding of Nahmanides on solid ground~~40. ~~Nahmanides considers Dinim the procedural law of~~ If a judge who possesses all ~~the Laws of Noah~~these noble attributes cannot be found, not only of Theft. Of course, this assumption may seem strange because all the examples of procedural law mentioned by Nahmanides pertain to Theft. Still, Nahmanides might have limited his examples to Theft because the case under discussion there - the abduction of Dinah - pertains then one should strive to ~~Theft. At any rate, if~~ find one ~~does not grant that Dinim for Nahmanides contains the whole~~ who meets as many of Noahic procedural law, one would be putting Nahmanides in the position of having to explain away why the substantive and the procedural aspects of Theft were given separate categories, whereas each of the remaining laws have their procedural and substantive aspects grouped togetherthese requirements as possible. For no one can doubt that there are procedural aspects to the remaining five laws, and Nahmanides clearly accepts the initial statement of Maimonides that "Noahites are charged with upholding justice - meaning that they must appoint judges who are to rule on their [remaining] six laws…"

~~In sum, the Nahmanides argument, as expressed in the paragraph quoted earlier, runs as follows~~PART TWO:Laws concerning witnesses

~~Anyway~~1. A person may be convicted in a Noahide court by the testimony of a single witness, but only if the witness is known to ~~my mind~~be righteous.<ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Witnesses, chapter 11, ~~this justice ...~~ law 2</ref> If the character of the witness is not ~~limited~~ known, it takes two witnesses to be able to convict the ~~establishment~~ accused. It is permissible for the witnesses as well as the judge to be relatives of ~~courts~~the accused.<ref>Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings, chapter 9, law 14</ref>

~~Maimonides thinks that~~ 2. A person may testify against himself in ~~the category of Justice there can be punishment for~~ a ~~crime~~ court of ~~omission - although~~ law,<ref>Sefer HaHinnukh, Commandment 26</ref> but since he ~~surely agrees that this would not be possible in~~ is the ~~other six categories or~~ accused, his character is definitely in ~~Mosaic law - because he thinks that justice~~ question, and a second witness is ~~essentially a requirement~~ necessary to be able to ~~establish courts and therefore the punishable violation of this requirement is necessarily an act of omission~~convict him. ~~Nahmanides however thinks justice is essentially another thing:~~

~~Rather, it charges the Noahites with laws on stealing, overcharging, withholding salaries~~3. The witnesses must be subjected to a thorough and systematic scrutiny to reveal any inconsistencies or other flaws in their testimony.<ref>Mishneh Torah, ~~the liability~~ Laws of ~~watchmen, rape, seduction, damages, bodily injury, loans~~Witnesses, ~~business transactions~~chapter 1, ~~and the like ....~~law 4</ref>

~~Justice, says Nahmanides,~~ 4. One is commanded to give truthful testimony in a ~~complete code~~ court of law~~, which is directed at~~ even if he knows the ~~court~~testimony will damage a friend or exonerate an enemy. And, ~~and which has in it everything the court must know in the realm of~~ this refers to civil ~~law ("loans, business transactions, and the like"), in the realm of~~ litigation or criminal matters. In a criminal ~~law ("stealing, overcharging, withholding salaries") which spill over from the area of Theft~~case, he is commanded to come forth and in give testimony even if the ~~realm of the other criminal areas: Homicide~~court does not request him to do so.<ref>Ibid., ~~Illicit Intercourse~~chapter 1, ~~Blasphemy, Idolatry, and Limb of a Living Creature.~~law 1</ref>

~~Thus, they place themselves under threat of execution by stealing, or cheating, or raping, or seducing another's daughter, or burning down another's silo, or injuring him, and the like~~5. ~~It is this same Law~~ There are ten classifications that ~~also obligates them to appoint~~ are disqualified as witnesses or as judges …in a court of law:

~~Having stated that justice embodies all Noahic procedural law, Nahmanides reasons as follows: Whenever~~ * Women* Slaves* Small children* Fools and the insane* The deaf and the ~~court undertakes punitive action against a citizen~~mute* The blind, ~~it makes no difference whether~~ even if they recognize voices* Known transgressors* People who care not how they behave in public* Husbands of women involved in the ~~action stems~~ trial* People who would benefit from a ~~violation of Theft ("stealing, cheating") or a violation of justice ("appoint judges") as far as basic procedure is concerned, because all Noahic procedure has a single source, Justice~~decision in the case<ref>Ibid. ~~Consequently, it would be incomprehensible to proceed for a crime of omission under justice~~, ~~when it is clear that one does not proceed for a crime of omission under Theft or Blasphemy~~chapter 9, ~~etc. Thus Nahmanicles concludes:~~ law 1</ref>

~~However, if they neglect to do this [to appoint judges] they are not to be executed~~ 6.A wicked person is disqualified as a witness.This means that the testimony of anyone who is known to transgress the Seven Universal Laws is inadmissible.<ref>Ibid., chapter 10, laws 1 and 2</ref>

~~Before leaving the text of Nahmanides, note~~ 7. The courts should ~~be taken that all~~ not admit the ~~following were considered instances~~ testimony of ~~Theft: "stealing, or cheating, or raping, or seducing another's daughter, or burning down another's silo, or injuring him…" Rape, where no violation of Illicit Intercourse~~ anyone unless it is ~~involved, is still Theft in~~ ascertained that ~~the use of a~~ this person~~'s body is his prerogative as much as~~ is involved in keeping the ~~use of his property. In including seducing another's daughter, Nahmanides goes on to assume that the consent~~ Seven Universal Laws and does acts of ~~a minor is disregarded~~ kindness and that the father has control over the property rights of his underage daughter, this being the case in Jewish law. In mentioning burning down another's silo or injuring him, Nahmanides reasons that under Theft it is not essential for the thief to take the property unto conducts himself~~, but that the essential element~~ in ~~Theft lies in depriving the owner of his property. Note that of the four categories of torts listed in the first Mishna. of Baba Kama as the Goring Ox, the Pit, the Eating Animal,~~ a straight way and ~~the Fire, Nahmanides singles out the Fire~~ is honest and ~~makes no mention of the remaining three~~upright. ~~Seemingly, the remaining three were left out intentionally and for this reason: The Fire may conceivably be grouped under Theft because the setting of the fire may be considered a criminal act~~<ref>Ibid. ~~The other three~~, ~~however~~chapter 11, may not be grouped under Theft because here the liability accrues from the mere neglect to act in preventing the public's property and one's own destructive property from coming into contact. And while such neglect gives a plaintiff sufficient grounds for filing a civil suit to recover damages, it does not render the defendant a criminal under Theft, there not being the required commission of a criminal act. Thus, in singling out the Fire, Nahmanides is reiterating his central contention in the dispute with Maimonicles, namely, that the neglect to appoint judges does not invite criminal punishment, for one can technically become a criminal only by committing a definite act.law 2</ref>

~~That Justice should be thought of as referring to~~ 8. The judge who admits testimony from a ~~thorough going system containing points of law, as Nahmanides and Isserles see~~ witness before it, is ~~denied by at least~~ ascertained whether the witness is qualified to testify is held responsible. This judge is considered as one ~~early author~~who perverts justice.<ref>Ibid. ~~Jacob Anatoli (1194-1256) expresses the view~~, ~~in his Hamelamed~~chapter 11, ~~that the Noahide tradition does not feature a comprehensive code of standard regulations under Justice. Anatoli writes:~~law 4</ref>

~~When the Noahites were enjoined concerning Justice, they were put under obligation to create legal arrangements ...~~9. It Whoever disgraces himself publicly is ~~incumbent on the judges to draw up rules of equity that shall be appropriate for that particular country,~~ disqualified as ~~exemplified by the manner~~ a witness. These are people who walk and eat in ~~which this matter is handled currently by the nations~~a coarse, ~~severally. Likewise~~impolite fashion in public, ~~it is incumbent upon merchants and upon the members of the trades to establish regulations for themselves... and whatever emerges as the law~~ or who go naked in ~~this manner is law~~public, ~~as much as that which is written~~ or who are involved in ~~the Bible. Furthermore~~any disgusting work or activity, or anyone ~~violating this law violates Scripture~~who feels no self‑embarrassment. All these people are considered on the level of dogs, ~~because Scripture commands the individual~~ and one cannot trust them to ~~accept the decisions of the contemporary jurists~~be stringent against giving false testimony.<ref>Ibid. ~~The dictum~~, ~~"The~~ chapter 11, law ~~of the land is the Law," relates to this concept.~~ 5</ref>

~~Nonetheless~~10. Even if a multitude of wise, God‑fearing people tell someone that they saw such‑and‑such a person commit such-and‑such a crime, and even though he believes it in his heart to be true, ~~Anatoli could agree~~ he is forbidden to testify in court unless he saw the ~~inclusion of~~ incident with his own eyes. Anyone who testifies on the ~~twenty imperatives which are listed above as features~~ hearsay of ~~Noahide Justice. For these twenty are but manifestations of those two aspects by~~ others is considered a false witness, which ~~the talmudic sources define Justice~~is tantamount to conspiring against another, (and this is a~~) that courts shall be established and (b) that any act which contributes to an unjust decision be prohibited~~grave transgression.<ref>Ibid., chapter 17, law 1</ref>

(Note: One who gives false testimony which convicts a person and causes him to be executed receives the death penalty.)

===Rabbi Yoel Schwartz (Jerusalem Court for Bnei Noah)===

===Civil law===

Civil law is the most widespread system of [[law]] in the world. It is also known as ~~~~'''European Continental law~~~~'''. The central source of law that is recognised as authoritative are ~~[[codification]]s~~ codifications in a [[constitution]] or [[statute]] passed by government, to amend a code. Civil law systems mainly derive from the [[Roman Empire]], and more particularly, the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' issued by the Emperor [[Justinian]] ca. 529AD. This was an extensive reform of the law in the [[Eastern Empire]], bringing it together into codified documents. Civil law today, in theory, is interpreted rather than developed or made by judges. Only ~~[[legislature|~~legislative]] enactments (rather than ~~[[judiciary|~~judicial~~]] [[precedent|~~precedents]]) are considered legally binding. However, in reality courts do pay attention to previous decisions, especially from higher courts.

Scholars of [[comparative law]] and economists promoting the [[legal origins theory]] usually subdivide civil law into three distinct groups:

! Description

|~~{{flagicon|Albania}}~~ [[Law of Albania|Albania]]

|The Civil Code of the Republic of Albania, 1991 really[http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014893.pdf]

|~~{{flagicon|Angola}}~~ [[Law of Angola|Angola]]

|Based on [[Portugal|Portuguese]] civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Argentina}}~~ [[Law of Argentina|Argentina]]|The [[Spain|Spanish]] legal tradition had a great influence on the [[Civil Code]] of [[Argentina]], basically a work of the [[Argentinean]] [[jurist]] [[Dalmacio ~~Vélez Sársfield~~Ve'lez Sa'rsfield]], who dedicated five years of his life on this task. The Civil Code came into effect on January 1, 1871. Beyond the influence of the Spanish legal tradition, the Argentinian Civil Code was also inspired by the Draft of the [[Brazilian]] Civil Code, the [[wikt:Draft|Draft]] of the Spanish Civil Code of 1851, the [[Napoleonic code]] and the [[Chilean]] Civil Code. The sources of this Civil Code also include various theoretical legal works, mainly of the great [[France|French]] jurists of the 19th century. It was the first Civil Law that consciously adopted as its cornerstone the distinction between i. rights from obligations and ii. real property rights, thus distancing itself from the French model.

The Argentinian Civil Code was also in effect in [[Paraguay]], as per a [[Paraguayan]] law of 1880, until the new Civil Code went in force in 1987.

During the second half of the 20th century, the [[German law|German]] legal theory became increasingly influential in Argentina.

|~~{{flagicon|Andorra}}~~ [[Laws of Andorra|Andorra]]

|Courts apply the customary laws of Andorra, supplemented with Roman law and customary Catalan law.<ref>http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3164.htm</ref>

|~~{{flagicon|Armenia}}~~ [[Law of Armenia|Armenia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Aruba}}~~ [[Law of Aruba|Aruba]]

|Based on [[Netherlands|Dutch]] civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Austria}}~~ [[Law of Austria|Austria]]|The [[Allgemeines ~~bürgerliches~~ bu"rgerliches Gesetzbuch]] (ABGB) of 1811

|~~{{flagicon|Azerbaijan}}~~ [[Law of Azerbaijan|Azerbaijan]]

|~~{{flagicon|Belarus}}~~ [[Law of Belarus|Belarus]]

|~~{{flagicon|Belgium}}~~ [[Law of Belgium|Belgium]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Benin}}~~ [[Law of Benin|Benin]]

|~~{{flagicon|Bolivia}}~~ [[Law of Bolivia|Bolivia]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Bosnia and~~ Herzegovina}} [[Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia and Herzegovina]]

|~~{{flagicon|Brazil}}~~ [[Law of Brazil|Brazil]]

|Derived from the [[Portugal|Portuguese]] civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Bulgaria}}~~ [[Law of Bulgaria|Bulgaria]]

|~~{{flagicon|Burkina Faso}}~~ [[Laws of Burkina Faso|Burkina Faso]]

|~~{{flagicon|Burundi}}~~ [[Laws of Burundi|Burundi]]

|~~{{flagicon|Chad}}~~ [[Laws of Chad|Chad]]

|~~{{flagicon|China}}~~ [[Law of the People's Republic of China|People's Republic of China]]

|based on civil law system; derived from Soviet and continental civil code legal principles.

|~~{{flagicon|Republic of the Congo}}~~ [[Laws of Republic of the Congo|Republic of the Congo]]

|~~{{flagicon|Democratic Republic of the Congo}}~~ [[Laws of Democratic Republic of the Congo|Democratic Republic of the Congo]]

|~~{{flagicon|Cote d'Ivoire}}~~ [[Laws of Cote d'Ivoire|Cote d'Ivoire]]

|~~{{flagicon|Cambodia}}~~ [[Law of Cambodia|Cambodia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Cape Verde}}~~ [[Law of Cape Verde|Cape Verde]]

|Based on [[Portugal|Portuguese]] civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Central African Republic}}~~ [[Law of Central African Republic|Central African Republic]]

|~~{{flagicon|Chile}}~~ [[Law of Chile|Chile]]|The Spanish legal tradition exercised an especially great influence on the [[civil code]] of [[Chile]]. On its turn, the Chilean civil code influenced to a large degree the drafting of the civil codes of other [[Latin-American]] states. For instance, the codes of [[Ecuador]] (1861) and [[Colombia]] (1873) constituted faithful reproductions of the Chilean code, but for very few exceptions. The compiler of the Civil Code of Chile, [[~~Andrés~~ Andre's Bello]], worked for its completion for almost 30 years, using elements, of the Spanish law on the one hand, and of other Western laws, especially of the French one, on the other. Indeed, it is noted that he consulted and used all of the codes that had been issued till then, starting from the era of [[Justinian]].

The Civil Code came into effect on January 1, 1857. Its technique is regarded as perfect; it is distinguished for the clarity, logic and cohesiveness of its provisions. As mentioned by Arminjon, Nolde, and Wolff ('Traite de droit ~~comparé~~compare'', Paris, 1950-1952) [[~~Andrés~~ Andre's Bello]] may be regarded as one of the great legislators of mankind. The influence of the [[Napoleonic code]] is great; it is observed however that e.g. in many provisions of [[property law]], the solutions of the French code civil were put aside in favor of pure [[Roman law]].

|~~{{flagicon|Colombia}}~~ [[Law of Colombia|Colombia]]

|Civil code introduced in 1873. Nearly faithful reproduction of the [[Chilean]] civil code

|~~{{flagicon|Costa Rica}}~~ [[Law of Costa Rica|Costa Rica]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Croatia}}~~ [[Law of Croatia|Croatia]]Kazneni zakon RH- Great influence of Austro- Hungarian law system

|~~{{flagicon|Cuba}}~~ [[Law of Cuba|Cuba]]

|Influenced by Spanish and American law with large elements of [[Communist legal theory]].

|~~{{flagicon|Czech Republic}}~~ [[Law of the Czech Republic|Czech Republic]]

|~~{{flagicon|Denmark}}~~ [[Courts of Denmark|Denmark]]

|Scandinavian-German civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Dominican Republic}}~~ [[Law of the Dominican Republic|Dominican Republic]]

|~~{{flagicon|Ecuador}}~~ [[Law of Ecuador|Ecuador]]

|Civil code introduced in 1861. Nearly faithful reproduction of the [[Chilean]] civil code

|~~{{flagicon|El Salvador}}~~ [[Law of El Salvador|El Salvador]]

|~~{{flagicon|Estonia}}~~ [[Law of Estonia|Estonia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Finland}}~~ [[Law of Finland|Finland]]

|~~{{flagicon|France}}~~ [[French law|France]]

|Based on the [[Napoleonic code]] (code civil of 1804)

|~~{{flagicon|Equatorial Guinea}}~~ [[Laws of Equatorial Guinea|Equatorial Guinea]]

|~~{{flagicon|Ethiopia}}~~ [[Laws of Ethiopia|Ethiopia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Gabon}}~~ [[Laws of Gabon|Gabon]]

|~~{{flagicon|Guinea}}~~ [[Laws of Guinea|Guinea]]

|~~{{flagicon|Guinea-Bissau}}~~ [[Laws of Guinea-Bissau|Guinea-Bissau]]

|~~{{flagicon|Georgia}}~~ [[Law of Georgia|Georgia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Germany}}~~ [[German law|Germany]]

|The [[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch]] of 1900

|~~{{flagicon|Greece}}~~ [[Law of Greece|Greece]]

|The Greek [[civil code]] of 1946, highly influenced by the German civil code of 1900 ([[Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch]]); the Greek civil code replaced the [[Byzantine-Roman]] civil law in effect in Greece since its independence (Νομική Διάταξη της Ανατολικής Χέρσου Ελλάδος, Legal Provision of Eastern Mainland Greece, November 1821: 'Οι Κοινωνικοί Νόμοι των Αειμνήστων Χριστιανών Αυτοκρατόρων της Ελλάδος μόνοι ισχύουσι κατά το παρόν εις την Ανατολικήν Χέρσον Ελλάδα', 'The Social [i.e. Civil] Laws of the Dear Departed Christian Emperors of Greece [referring to the Byzantine Emperors] alone are in effect at present in Eastern Mainland Greece')

|~~{{flagicon|Guatemala}}~~ [[Law of Guatemala|Guatemala]]

|~~{{flagicon|Haiti}}~~ [[Law of Haiti|Haiti]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Honduras}}~~ [[Law of Honduras|Honduras]]

|~~{{flagicon|Hungary}}~~ [[Law of Hungary|Hungary]]

|~~{{flagicon|Iceland}}~~ [[Law of Iceland|Iceland]]

|Based on Germanic traditional laws and influenced by Medieval Norwegian and Danish laws.

|~~{{flagicon|Italy}}~~ [[Law of Italy|Italy]]

|Based on codified [[Roman law]], with elements of the [[Napoleonic civil code]]; civil code of 1942 replaced the original one of 1865

|~~{{flagicon|Japan}}~~ [[Japanese law|Japan]]

|Modeled after European (primarily German) civil law system. Japanese civil code of 1895.

|~~{{flagicon|Latvia}}~~ [[Law of Latvia|Latvia]]

|Largely influenced by Germany, medium influences from Russian and Soviet law.

|~~{{flagicon|Lebanon}}~~ [[Law of Lebanon|Lebanon]]

|Modeled after French civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Lithuania}}~~ [[Law of Lithuania|Lithuania]]

|Modeled after Dutch civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Luxembourg}}~~ [[Law of Luxembourg|Luxembourg]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Macau}}~~ [[Legal system of Macau|Macau]] ~~{{flagicon|China}}~~ ([[China]])

|Based on the Portuguese strand of the continental tradition, itself much influenced by Germany; also influenced by the law of the PRC

|~~{{flagicon|Mexico}}~~ [[Legal system of Mexico|Mexico]]

|"The origins of Mexico's legal system are both ancient and classical, based on the Greek, Roman and French legal systems, and the Mexican system shares more in common with other legal systems throughout the world (especially those in Latin America and most of continental Europe)..." From: http://www.mexonline.com/lawreview.htm Jaime B. Berger Stender Attorney at Law author, Tijuana, B.C., Mexico

|~~{{flagicon|Mongolia}}~~ [[Law of Mongolia|Mongolia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Netherlands}}~~ [[Law of the Netherlands|Netherlands]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Norway}}~~ [[Law of Norway|Norway]]

|Scandinavian-German civil law

|~~{{flagicon|Panama}}~~ [[Law of Panama|Panama]]

|~~{{flagicon|Paraguay}}~~ [[Law of Paraguay|Paraguay]]

|The Paraguayan Civil Code in force since 1987 is largely influenced by the Napoleonic Code and the Argentinian Code

|~~{{flagicon|Peru}}~~ [[Law of Peru|Peru]]

|~~{{flagicon|Poland}}~~ [[Polish law|Poland]]

|The Polish Civil Code in force since 1965

|~~{{flagicon|Portugal}}~~ [[Portuguese law|Portugal]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]] and later by the German Civil Law

|~~{{flagicon|Taiwan}}~~ [[Law of the Republic of China|Republic of China (Taiwan)]]

|~~{{flagicon|Romania}}~~ [[Romanian law|Romania]]

|Based on the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Russia}}~~ [[Law of Russia|Russia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Slovakia}}~~ [[Law of Slovakia|Slovakia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Spain}}~~ [[Law of Spain|Spain]]

|Influenced by the [[Napoleonic Code]]

|~~{{flagicon|Sweden}}~~ [[Law of Sweden|Sweden]]

|Scandinavian-German civil law. Like all Scandinavian legal systems, it is distinguished by its traditional character and for the fact that it did not adopt elements of Roman law. It is indeed worth mentioning that it assimilated very few elements of foreign laws whatsoever. It is also interesting that the Napoleonic Code had no influence in codification of law in Scandinavia. The historical basis of the law of Sweden, just as for all Nordic countries, is the Old German law. Codification of the law started in Sweden during the 18th century, preceding the codifications of most other European countries. However, neither Sweden, nor any other Nordic state created a civil code of the kind of the Code Civil or the BGB.

|~~{{flagicon|Switzerland}}~~ [[Law of Switzerland|Switzerland]]

|The [[Zivilgesetzbuch]] of 1908 and 1912 (obligations; fifth book)

|~~{{flagicon|Turkey}}~~ [[Law of Turkey|Turkey]]|Modeled after the [[Swiss]] civil law ([[Zivilgesetzbuch]]) of 1907; this has been a conscious choice of [[Kemal ~~Atatürk~~Atatu"rk]], the founder of the modern [[Turkey|Turkish state]], in order to abolish the [[Islamic law]] ([[Sharia]]), aiming at westernizing the country

|~~{{flagicon|Slovakia}}~~ [[Law of Slovakia|Slovakia]]

|~~{{flagicon|Uruguay}}~~ [[Law of Uruguay|Uruguay]]

|~~{{flagicon|Vatican City}}~~ [[Law of the Vatican City|Vatican City]]

|~~{{flagicon|Vietnam}}~~ [[Legal system in Vietnam|Vietnam]]

|[[Communism|Communist legal theory]] and [[French civil law]]

! Description

| ~~{{flagicon|Antigua and Barbuda}}~~ [[Law of Antigua and Barbuda|Antigua and Barbuda]]